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INTRODUCTION

This paper questions whether the toolbox of traditional public international law is
equipped to address today’s global socio-economic needs. It focuses on two of the main
features of the traditional international legal system:
(i)

international law’s dichotomy between legally binding norms (‘hard law’) and
non-binding declarations or statements of principle (‘soft law’), where, in
principle, only the former (hard law) can be normatively held and enforced
against states1;

(ii)

the focus of international law (other than human rights and international
criminal law) on states as the subjects of rights and obligations.

The first feature (focus on hard law or international law’s ‘legal positivism’) logically
derives from the second (focus on states): Since states are the subjects of rights and
obligations, and states are considered as sovereign and equal, norms of international law
only emerge when states, in one way or the other, have consented to those norms as
legally binding (be it in the form of treaties, custom or general principles of law).
The WTO legal regime exemplifies these two features of hard law centered on states. It
is probably at the apex of what traditional international law aspires to: with a quasiuniversal membership of close to 150 states, the WTO imposes disciplines on state
conduct through legally binding obligations that are enforced by a compulsory, state-tostate dispute settlement mechanism (panels and the WTO Appellate Body).
Against this background of hard law centered on states, as operationalized in the WTO,
the broader reality of normative patterns governing today’s socio-economic affairs looks,
however, quite different: First, if and when states do manage to cooperate (other than at
the WTO), it increasingly takes the form of soft law; Second, non-state actors emerged
both as creators and potential subjects of global norms.
The paper starts off with an overview of these ‘non-traditional’ sources and players on
the global legal scene (Section II). They have, however, been described and commented
upon earlier.2 What this paper tries to add then is an assessment of the extent to which
these new sources and players are taken into account in the more traditional WTO legal
regime. More broadly, it questions, firstly, whether international law takes sufficient
cognizance of those non-traditional sources and players when resolving a specific
international legal question or dispute (or whether it limits itself to hard law created by
states) and, secondly, whether international law is equipped, in turn, to control, legitimize

1

Peter Hulsroj, Three Sources – No River, A Hard Look at the Sources of Public International Law with
Particular Emphasis on Custom and General Principles of Law, 54 Zeitschrift für Offtentliches Recht 219259; Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law? AJIL (1983) 413-442.
2
See, for example, Shelton, supra note 8 and Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of
Legal Responsibility, 11 Yale L. J. 443 (2001).
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and, as the case may be, regulate those new sources and players (or whether its scope is
limited to control and discipline state conduct).
This inquiry proceeds from two different angles.3 A first angle (set out in Section III) is
concerned about whether the hard law, state-to-state WTO regime takes sufficient
account of the new (softer) normative sources outlined in Section II, including those
created by non-state actors. This angle worries about a certain WTO supremacy -- i.e., a
risk of over-inclusion of WTO obligations -- fearing that the non-traditional sources of
non-WTO law would play no or not a sufficient role in the resolution of trade disputes. Is
the WTO ‘missing the boat’ by finding, for example, that a domestic measure is in
violation of trade rules whilst that very same measure is justified or even imposed by
other, newer forms of social regulation (be it an environmental declaration, or a private or
semi-private international standard) outside the four corners of traditional WTO law?
A second angle (elaborated in Section IV) worries not about the impact of non-traditional
sources and players in the WTO, but about the WTO itself and whether the WTO may
not be running behind realities in covering only state conduct and hard, state-to-state
norms, without control over today’s new sources and players on the international
economic scene (i.e., a risk of under-inclusion of WTO obligations). Is the WTO thereby
‘missing the boat’ and tolerating norms and conduct (such as codes of good practice,
NGO boycotts or semi-private standards) that may restrict trade as much as, or even more
than, traditional tariffs or state imposed quantitative restrictions?

II.

NEW SOURCES AND PLAYERS IN GLOBAL REGULATION
1.

Hard law versus soft law: A “partially globalized” world?

Where states do cooperate (other than at the WTO) such cooperation increasingly takes
the form of soft law declarations, codes of conduct or weakly enforceable treaties. When
states decided, for example, to do something about the trade in so-called conflict
diamonds (that is, diamonds mined by rebel groups and sold to fund internal wars,
possibly even global terrorism), they did so in the from of the Kimberley Process
Certification “scheme”, that is, a set of precise rules that were explicitly stated as not
legally binding but which states promised to implement domestically.4 Germany has
even made it official foreign policy that if international cooperation can be achieved
through soft law, German negotiators should not conclude a legally binding treaty.

3

A third angle, not pursued in this paper, is whether the WTO itself ought to move away from its hard-lawonly approach and start regulating trade also in softer forms, be it by non-binding declarations or
obligations not subject to the strict DSU (but monitored, for example, under a compliance mechanism
focused on carrots and plans of action, rather sticks and trade sanctions). For a suggestion in this respect,
see Kenneth Abbott, International action on bribery and corruption: Why the dog didn’t bark in the WTO,
in DANIEL KENNEDY AND JAMES SOUTHWICK (EDS.), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERT HUDEC (2002), 177.
4
Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex: What to Make of the WTO Waiver for
“Conflict Diamonds”, 24 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003:4), 1177-1207.
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In other non-WTO areas, such as the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol or the WHO
Framework Convention on Tobacco, states did conclude a legally binding treaty, but
unlike the WTO treaty, did not back it up with a credible enforcement mechanism. In yet
other fields, states failed to cooperate at all (as in, for example, the Kyoto Protocol, not
ratified by the USA and Russia) or created regimes that are not seen as sufficiently
complied with (such as, for example, ILO labor or UN human rights conventions).
When compared to the strictly enforced trade obligations at the WTO, this lack of
international cooperation in fields other than the economic one, led commentators to term
today’s world as a “partially globalized world”5 or to find a “global governance deficit of
considerable magnitude”.6 In my recent book, I spoke of a “two class society” of
international law norms.7 It is, indeed, quite a paradox that in those areas that we would
domestically frame as constitutional (such as human rights) less (enforceable)
international cooperation takes place than in areas that we would domestically portray as
of mere commercial value (such as trade rules).
At the same time, plausible reasons can be found for this discrepancy (other than the
argument that governments care more about trade than about human rights or the
environment). First, trade cooperation is hugely facilitated because it is essentially a winwin situation where all participants stand to gain by the reciprocal exchange of market
openings. In addition, because of the reciprocity inherent in trade deals, WTO rules are
relatively easily enforced based on the threat of reciprocal withdrawals in case a country
reneges on the deal (‘if you unjustifiably close-off your market for my products, I will do
the same for yours’). This logic of reciprocity is absent both in the creation and the
enforcement of, for example, human rights or environmental rules (it is no credible threat
to say that ‘if you torture your nationals, I will reciprocate by torturing mine’). Put
differently, because of reciprocity, the collective action and free-rider problem that
traditionally stalls international cooperation is far less prominent in the field of trade than
it is in other fields.
Second, hard law backed up by a state-to-state dispute mechanism and trade sanctions is
not necessarily the most efficient compliance tool for all regimes. Whilst it may work for
trade rules, monitoring and a combination of sticks and carrots may be more efficient to
achieve, for example, environmental objectives.8
Third, while trade law is essentially about making money and enhancing material
welfare, the economic liberties that it ensures have, in and of themselves, a human rights

5

Robert Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World, in David Held and Anthony McGrew
(eds.), Governing Globalization (2002), 325.
6
Gary Gereffi and Frederick Mayer, Making Globalization Work, February 2004 (paper on file with
author), 2.
7
JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), 441.
8
For reasons why soft law is sometimes the preferred and better approach than hard law, see DIANA
SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2000).
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quality (economic freedoms).9 In addition, through the welfare that they create, trade
rules are instrumental in the achievement of non-economic goals (such as environmental
or human rights protection, public health or social justice) depending, of course, on how
national governments redistribute this wealth. At the same time, those positive features
of a liberal market do not obliterate the need for non-economic regulation, be it nationally
or globally, so as to correct so-called negative externalities (e.g. environmental harm not
sufficiently calculated into the cost of goods or services) or to ensure fair competition
(e.g. through anti-trust law). Liberalized markets must go hand in hand and can only be
maintained and flourish when combined with a minimum of government intervention. In
this sense, the world does remain “partially globalized” and in a “global governance
deficit”.
2.

Non-state actors as sources and subjects of global regulation

Besides a move away from the traditional international law focus on hard law, legal
patterns of global cooperation have also expanded beyond the state: non-state actors – in
particular NGOs and multinational corporations (MNCs) – have become crucial players
both as norm-creators/enforcers and as potential subjects of international legal discipline.
a.

NGOs and MNCs as sources and enforcers of global regulation

Confronted with what they perceive as insufficient or ineffective state-to-state agreed
rules on social policy, NGOs have started to monitor those rules themselves (e.g. Human
Rights Watch or Oxfam’s ‘Make Trade Fair’ campaign) or created their own rules or
codes of conduct for states (e.g. Transparency International) as well as MNCs (e.g. Social
Accountability International (SAI) or Fair Trade Labeling Organizations International).
MNCs, in turn, faced with increasing pressure from NGOs and consumers to conduct
business in a socially responsible manner wherever they operate (even in the absence of
government-imposed disciplines), have embraced the notion of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CRS). MNCs adopted their own company-specific codes of conduct (e.g.
the corporate codes of Wal-Mart, the Gap or BP) or industry wide norms on human
rights, environmental protection, labor standards etc. (e.g. the ‘Equator Principles’
adopted by financial institutions or the work of the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development).
Finally, states, NGOs and MNCs increasingly cooperate to construe and agree on
collectively formulated norms (e.g. the UN’s Global Compact, a partnership between the
UN and private companies, or semi-private standardization bodies such as the
International Standardization Organization (ISO) or the International Accounting
Standards Board). They have also joined forces to monitor compliance with state-agreed
norms (e.g. the role of NGOs in the implementation of the Kimberley Scheme on conflict

9

For a view taking this point a step further qualifying basic WTO obligations as human rights, see ErnstUlrich Petersmann, Time for a UN “Global Compact” for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of
Worldwide Organizations, European Journal of International Law (2002), 621-650.
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diamonds10 or the role of SAI in the monitoring of compliance with the 8 core ILO labor
codes under the 2002 Belgian Law to Promote Socially Responsible Production11).
This cross-actor cooperation may enhance coherence in the different standards enacted
and bolster the credibility and effectiveness of those standards (in particular through
independent, third-party monitoring). The participation of NGOs or private
standardization/monitoring bodies in state-created norms is also thought to increase the
legitimacy of those norms and may lighten the financial and human resource burden on
states in the process of norm implementation.
b.

NGOs and MNCs as subjects disciplined by global regulation

Besides creators, monitors and enforcers of global norms, NGOs and MNCs have also
become subjects of such norms in their own right. Most clearly, MNCs are the subjects
of many of the codes of conduct referred to. With increased power and influence for
MNCs on the world scene (which, through globalization, cannot always be controlled by
national governments), should come increased responsibilities, the argument goes.
In some instances (such as the self-imposed company-specific or industry-wide codes of
good practice), MNCs are both the lawmaker and the subject of the law, or both party and
judge (which has raised the question of whether companies have genuinely embraced
CSR or merely use it as a straw-man to fence off criticism and increase profits). In other
cases, the norms are created and monitored by NGOs (such as SAI) or, a novelty in
international law, negotiated by states and imposed directly under international law on
MNCs (as in the Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights approved in August 2003 by the UN
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights).
MNCs have also become the subject of international law enforcement before national
courts, in particular US federal courts under the 1789 Alien Torts Claim Act (e.g. the
Unocal case pitting Burmese nationals against the California oil company Unocal, for
Unocal’s alleged involvement in forced labor and torture in a Burmese pipeline project).

10

To monitor the implementation of the Kimberley scheme, a Working Group on Monitoring was
established. Interestingly, this Working Group consists of eight countries and the European Community as
well as two NGOs (Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada) and one industry organization (World
Diamond Council). The Working Group makes its recommendation to the Chair of the Kimberley scheme
who, in the end, is left with the final decision whether or not to expel a Participant from the scheme. On 9
July 2004, the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazaville) was removed from the scheme following the
Working Group procedures (including a site visit by an expert team). See
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/.
11
Under the Belgian law, SAI is the organization that selects and accredits audit firms abroad which are
entitled to certify compliance with SAI’s own SA8000 human workforce standard which, in turn, is
regarded as equivalent to the criteria set out in the Belgian law. Note, however, that since the entry into
force of the Belgian social label (on 1 September 2002), only one single company requested and obtained
the label, namely the Belgian insurance company Ethias and this only for one of its services, its “Home
Comfort Plus”, a home insurance policy. The link between a social label and inducing compliance with
minimum labor standards abroad is, in that case, quite strained.
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The reach of the Alien Torts Claim Act was, however, recently restricted by a landmark
US Supreme Court opinion in Alvarez-Machain (discussed below in Section IV).
Note further that MNCs not only face obligations under modern international law, they
have also been granted specific rights under a long series of regional and bilateral
investment treaties. Those rights are, in most cases, of a hard law nature (unlike MNCs
obligations in codes of conduct) that MNCs can directly enforce at the international level
in compulsory investor-state dispute mechanisms (such as Chapter 11 of NAFTA). In
other words, while MNCs may increasingly carry rights and obligations under
international law, MNC rights remain of a more precise and enforceable nature than
MNC obligations.
NGOs, in turn, have faced criticism of a lack of accountability matching their power and
influence in the market place (this influence is readily apparent in successful NGO
instigated consumer boycotts against, for example, Coca Cola, Nestle or apartheid South
Africa; Oxfam’s alleged influence in the failure of the WTO meeting in Cancun as well
as its role in the fight against rich countries’ export subsidies12 or Nestle’s backing down
in an investment claim against Ethiopia because of NGO triggered consumer outrage).
As a result, new mechanisms have recently emerged with a view to checking the
operation and financing of NGOs so as to increase their accountability to members,
contributors and consumers at large (see, for example, the American Enterprise Institute’s
ngowatch.org or One World Trust’s Global Accountability Project rating the
transparency and accountability of both states and NGOs).

III.

NON-TRADITIONAL PATTERNS OF GLOBAL REGULATION
AND THE WTO

1.

Are WTO trade obligations over-inclusive?

Notwithstanding the complexities of today’s world economy, the standard work of a
WTO panelist seems remarkably simple and confined. All he or she can and must do, it
is generally believed, is to decide whether a given WTO member has violated one of the
WTO rules agreed on in the 1994 Final Act. It is, indeed, tempting for international trade
lawyers to perceive the world of trade, and the legal patterns that govern it, as limited to
what the WTO covers and regulates. This cosy and comforting perspective, limited to the
four corners of the hard law set out in the so-called WTO covered agreements, has
however one major risk: the marginalization of the WTO as an appropriate forum for the
settlement of complex trade disputes touching on a broad range of societal questions
(from public health to the environment, from worker protection to the protection of
minors).

12

At the time of writing Oxfam has, for example, a web-page rolling where it enables supporters to send a
direct email to US President Bush urging him (in a pre-set text) to implement the WTO ruling condemning
US cotton subsidies. See http://www.maketradefair.com/en/index.htm.
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This risk is one of over-inclusion of WTO trade obligations. It is the risk that WTO
obligations are found to be violated in the confined universe of trade law, even though in
the wider corpus of global legal patterns the conduct in question may be perfectly legal or
justified (because permitted, or even called for, in another treaty or norm). If and when
this risk materializes it would hardly be correct to state that disputes are genuinely
“settled” at the WTO; at best, they would then be offered one outcome limited to trade
law; at worst, this outcome would be meaningless since contradicted under another set of
global norms, thereby seriously tarnishing the legitimacy and enforceability of WTO
rulings. In this sense, it would then be more appropriate to talk about “confined” or
“within-the-box” adjudication rather than genuine “dispute settlement” that brings
closure to a case.
a.

Non-WTO norms legally binding on the disputing parties

Panels and the Appellate Body have realized this first threat of ‘missing the boat’ and
have, unlike panels operating under GATT 1947, construed WTO rules in the wider
context of international law (with references to rules of public international law on
questions such as treaty interpretation, burden of proof, private counsel, amicus curiae or
the proportionality of countermeasures, as well as other non-WTO treaties, in particular,
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)).13
Although it has now become common practice for panels and the Appellate Body to
interpret WTO rules with reference to other rules of international law and to apply
general rules of treaty law, state responsibility and dispute settlement, what remains to be
decided is whether a violation of the WTO treaty can be justified, independently, by
another norm of international law binding on the disputing parties (for example, even if a
trade restriction violates GATT and cannot be justified under the exceptions of GATT
Art. XX, can another rule, say, an MEA or ILO declaration, that is binding on the
disputing parties, still offer a valid defense on the basis of which a WTO panel can
decline to find a violation of WTO rules)?
In my view, this is an extra step that must be taken and one that can be perfectly justified
under traditional principles of international law, distinguishing the limited jurisdiction of
WTO panels (in casu, limited to finding violations of WTO obligations) from the law that
WTO panels can apply in the exercise of their limited jurisdiction, i.e., in their
examination of WTO claims (in casu, any valid rule of international law binding on the
disputing parties that does not affect the rights of third parties).14
b.

Soft law agreed to by the disputing parties

While the above ‘extra mile’ would avoid situations where a WTO panel finds a violation
even though another (legally binding) treaty explicitly agreed upon between the parties
13

See Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?,
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 95, July 2001, 535-578.
14
See Joost Pauwelyn, How to Win a WTO dispute based on non-WTO law: Questions of Jurisdiction and
Merits, JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE (2003:6) 997-1030.
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requires or permits the conduct, would the suggested approach also give sufficient
deference to the non-traditional, softer law referred to earlier (e.g. the Kimberley Scheme,
a non-binding declaration in which states commit themselves to ban trade in conflict
diamonds)? In my view, it could.
Soft law can, first of all, play a crucial law in the interpretation of flexible WTO
provisions (as discussed below). When it comes to soft law that genuinely contradicts
hard WTO law, much will depends on how one construes the definition of conflict
between two norms, e.g. between a WTO rule and a Kimberley scheme provision.
Should, as was implied by earlier Appellate Body case law, a conflict only be found in
the event of two mutually exclusive obligations, i.e., when a state cannot possibly comply
with both provisions at the same time?15 In my view, this definition of conflict is too
restrictive. As implied in the more recent Appellate Body ruling on EC – GSP, conflict
between two norms also includes the situation where one norm prohibits that what
another norm explicitly permits.16 In other words, even though, in that situation, both
norms can be complied with at the same time (by not invoking the permissive norm and
simply complying with the prohibition), a conflict still arises because the permissive
norm cannot be given its effect in the face of the prohibition. Under this broader
definition of conflict, a conflict does arise in case GATT were, for example, to prohibit a
ban on conflict diamonds (a fact that is far from clear17) while the Kimberley scheme
explicitly permits such ban (even though, as a non-binding scheme, it does not legally

15

Appellate Body report on Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Imports of Portland Cement
from Mexico, complaint by Mexico (WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted on 25 November 1998, at para. 65):
In our view, it is only where the provisions of the DSU and the specific or additional rules and
procedures of a covered agreement cannot be read as complementing each other that the special or
additional provisions are to prevail. A special or additional provision should only be found to
prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead
to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them” (underlining
added).

16

In that case, the potential for conflict was one between GATT Article I (prohibiting discrimination
between foreign trade partners member of the WTO) and the Enabling Clause (permitting tariff preferences
to be awarded only to developing countries). By finding a potential for conflict between such prohibition
(GATT Article I) and permission (Enabling Clause), the Appellate Body confirmed that an obligation can,
indeed, conflict with a right:
…the text of paragraph 1 of the Enabling Clause ensures that, to the extent that there is a conflict
between measures under the Enabling Clause and the MFN obligation in Article I:1, the Enabling
Clause, as the more specific rule, prevails over Article I:1. In order to determine whether such a
conflict exists, however, a dispute settlement panel should, as a first step, examine the consistency
of a challenged measure with Article I:1, as the general rule. If the measure is considered at this
stage to be inconsistent with Article I:1, the panel should then examine, as a second step, whether
the measure is nevertheless justified by the Enabling Clause. It is only at this latter stage that a
final determination of consistency with the Enabling Clause or inconsistency with Article I:1 can
be made (European Communities—Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004), para. 101).
17
See supra note 4.
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impose an obligation to do so).18 In this sense, the soft law Kimberley scheme could
provide a valid defense against a claim of WTO violation, albeit only as between two
WTO members that agreed to the scheme.19
c.

Legal Patterns not binding on the disputing parties

The above-suggested steps (that is, accepting non-WTO norms agreed to by both parties
as a possible justification for WTO violation) – though still seen by many as
revolutionary -- may not be enough to placate the concerns of WTO ‘marginalization’
described earlier. It leaves out norms that were not consented to by the disputing parties
(such as the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol in the US-EC dispute over GMOs because the
US did not sign the Protocol, or international Codex Alimentarius standards on hormones
not accepted by the EC), as well as norms created by non-state actors (be it NGO or
MNC codes of conduct or standards enacted in (semi-) private bodies). This begs the
question, of course, whether it is at all appropriate for a WTO panel to refer to such
sources, in particular, given the traditional international law rule that a state cannot be
held by law that it did not consent to.
International standards referred to in the SPS and TBT agreements
One major avenue to incorporate at least some of those non-traditional sources is now
offered in the SPS and TBT agreements. Those agreements explicitly refer to
international standards adopted outside of the WTO as a safe-haven from WTO
discipline. In other words, when a WTO member “conforms to” (for TBT purposes,
when the measure is “in accordance with”) any of those international standards it cannot
be found to violate SPS/TBT rules. Crucially, this safe-haven applies even though the
standard is not legally binding in and of itself nor must it be adopted by consensus or
binding on the disputing parties in the WTO dispute.20
There are, however, notable differences between the safe-haven offered in SPS as
opposed to that set out in TBT.

18

If, based on the non-binding nature of the Kimberly scheme, also “rights” under that scheme were held to
be of no normative force, the scheme could, however, have the same effect of justifying the measure
pursuant to the principles of good faith and/or estoppel (for a country to first agree to the Kimberley
scheme and then to sue another scheme participant for WTO violation is arguably against the principle of
good faith; such WTO complaint could also be said to be estopped by means of the complainant’s very
agreement to the Kimberley scheme).
19
This line of thinking was confirmed when in May 2003 all WTO Members agreed to grant a waiver for
trade restrictions imposed on non-participants in the Kimberley Scheme on condition that such restrictions
were consistent with that scheme. In other words, WTO Members implied that as between participants to
the scheme no waiver was needed. There, the Kimberley Scheme itself could justify the trade restriction,
even before a WTO panel; only restrictions on non-participants needed a waiver (WTO General Council,
Proposed Agenda, WT/GC/W/498 (13 May 2003) Item VI. The text of the waiver can be found in the
revised waiver request WTO Council for Trade in Goods, Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds: Communication, G/C/W/432/Rev.1 (24 Feb. 2003).
20
SPS Article 3.2; TBT Article 2.5. The Explanatory note to TBT Annex 1.2, defining the term
“standard”, explicitly states: “This Agreement covers also documents that are not based on consensus”.
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In SPS, the international standards referred to are currently limited to “standards,
guidelines and recommendations” established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission
and those developed under the auspices of the International Office of Epizootics or the
International Plant Protection Convention.21 All three organizations are intergovernmental bodies (none of them is of the semi-private or private nature discussed
earlier, in contrast to TBT, see below). Moreover, no explicit provision is included that
the standards be of a voluntary, non-binding nature (in contrast to international standards
referred to in TBT, see below).
In TBT, the range of possible standards that can offer a safe-haven is much broader. As
the panel on EC - Sardines found, for TBT purposes, "international standards are
standards that are developed by international bodies".22 This, of course, begs the
question of how to define the terms “standard” and “international body”.
First, the word "standard" is defined in TBT Annex 1.2 as: "Document approved by a
recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or
characteristics for products or related processes and production methods, with which
compliance is not mandatory" (emphasis added). Hence, the fact that, for example, the
Kimberley scheme requirements are not mandatory could make them "standards" in the
TBT sense and, ironically, somewhat more important for TBT purposes than, for
example, legally binding MEAs since only compliance with international "standards"
offers a presumption of TBT conformity.23
Second, the word "international body" is defined in TBT Annex 1.4 as: "Body or system
whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members". Crucially,
such “international body” setting standards could by inter-governmental (such as,
arguably, the Kimberley scheme)24 or semi-private (such as ISO) since the “relevant
bodies” of WTO members referred to can either be governmental or non-governmental.
At the same time, “non-governmental body” is restrictively defined in TBT Annex 1.8 as
a “[b]ody other than a central government body or a local government body, including a
non-governmental body which has legal power to enforce a technical regulation”. As a
result, private standardizing bodies or NGOs setting codes of good practice, even those
open to national NGOs from all WTO members (pursuant to TBT Annex 1.4), are
unlikely to be accepted as setting “international standards” for as long as the national
NGOs have not been granted “legal power to enforce a technical regulation”. This “legal
21

Annex A, para. 3 to the SPS Agreement.
WTO Panel Report, European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/R, para. 7.63
(2002).
23
The fact that non-binding international standards, not even consented to by the disputing parties, can
therefore be held against WTO members is another reason why a fortiori legally binding rules of
international law should be permitted to operate as a defense before a WTO panel.
24
The inter-governmental Kimberley scheme, for example, explicitly states: "participation in the
Certification Scheme is open on a global, non-discriminatory basis to all Applicants willing and able to
fulfill the requirements of that scheme" (Section VI.8 of the Kimberley scheme). As a result, membership
in the Kimberley Process "is open to the relevant bodies of at least all [WTO] Members". Consequently,
Kimberley requirements could well qualify as "international standards" triggering a presumption of TBT
conformity.
22
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power” is the link that must exist between an NGO and the WTO member in question
before the NGO activity can be relevant for (or, for that matter, be subject to, see below)
the TBT agreement.
Importantly, whilst international standards under SPS all relate to specifications inherent
in the physical characteristics of the product itself (e.g., maximum hormone residues in
meat or the species of fish to be called sardines), the international standards under TBT
may relate to the product itself as well as to the process or production method by which
the product was produced (arguable including also whether it was produced in conformity
with certain labor standards, a point that remains, however, strongly debated). 25
Note further that the presumption of conformity in TBT is only triggered for technical
regulations, not for standards (see TBT Annex 3, para. E), nor for conformity assessment
procedures (see TBT Article 5.4), although in both cases a similar presumption of
compliance could be implied from the obligation (in those respective TBT provisions) to
base national standards and conformity assessment procedures on international standards.
Note also that the presumption of compliance in SPS Article 3.2 applies in respect of all
SPS provisions and GATT 1994, whereas that in TBT Article 2.5 is limited to a
presumption that the national measure does not create “an unnecessary obstacle to
international trade”, i.e., meets the obligation set out in TBT Art. 2.2. Finally, the TBT
presumption is explicitly defined as “rebuttable”, the SPS presumption is silent on
whether it can be rebutted.
Most relevant for present purposes, the above-summarized SPS and TBT references to
international standards imply that a number of non-WTO norms can be taken into
account in the settlement of trade disputes, even though
(i)

they were never consented to by the disputing parties (in particular the
defendant, as was the case in EC – Hormones); and

(ii)

they were created by semi-private bodies (such as ISO) or inter-governmental
bodies where non-state actors (ranging from scientific experts, business
associations and, to a lesser extent, NGOs) have a major impact.

Although this may placate some of the concerns expressed earlier about the role of nontraditional sources and players in WTO dispute settlement, it raises two new problems.

25

TBT Annex 2.2, defining “standards”, includes a reference to “products or related processes and
production methods” (in contrast to the definition of “technical regulation” in TBT Annex 2.1, it does not
include the word “their” before “related”). Moreover, TBT Annex 2.2 adds: “[The term standard] may
also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling requirements as
they apply to a product, process or production method”. In an Explanatory Note Annex 2.2 also specifies
that TBT does not apply to services standards, but “only” to technical regulations, standards and conformity
assessment procedures “related to products or processes and production methods”.
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First, although the SPS/TBT references thus avoid the strictures of the traditional
international law rule of state consent26, the question remains, however, whether the
collective action problem grounded in the consent rule has not simply migrated from the
WTO to the standardizing bodies themselves, that is, whether because of the SPS/TBT
references, standard-making in, for example, Codex or ISO will not be chilled or become
deadlocked (indeed, knowing that standards are no longer voluntary but at least partially
enforceable at the WTO, countries may be wary to issue new standards).
Second, whilst the SPS reference is clearly circumscribed to three other organizations,
one could question whether the open TBT reference to “standards that are developed by
international bodies" is not overly broad. Would it be enough, for example, for 10 or 20
or even 2 WTO members to set up a standardizing body, issue trade restrictive standards
on a product that they want to protect (say GMOs) and open that standardizing body to all
other WTO members (knowing too well that the countries with whom they have a trade
dispute over the product concerned will never join), for the standard to offer a safe-haven
from WTO violation, even as against WTO members that decided not to join the body?
Moreover, what happens in case conflicting “international standards” get developed by
different “international bodies”? Is conformity with either standard sufficient to trigger
the presumption of SPS/TBT compliance or must the WTO decide which of the two is
most “relevant”?
Third, if the international standards referred to are, indeed, partly created at the demand
and under the pressure of non-governmental bodies, including businesses, how can the
WTO ensure that those standards are legitimate, unbiased and sufficiently supported by
all interested parties, including consumers? So far, panels and the Appellate Body have
refused to examine the transparency, due process and other procedural qualities of
international standards invoked. Instead, they blindly accepted any standard that meets
the technical, source-based definitions in the SPS and TBT agreements.27 Joanne Scott,
for example, has recently argued that the Appellate Body ought to examine the
procedural appropriateness and legitimacy of international standards before giving
deference to them, pleading to make international standards (as well as MEAs)
contingent or contestable, not absolute.28 At the same time, once such procedural
requirements of transparency, due process, openness, impartiality etc met, she would
advise the Appellate Body to refer to the norm or standard in question even though it
does not meet the SPS/TBT international standard definition and does not constitute a
26

As Robert Howse terms it in his paper outline for this conference, the SPS/TBT references are “a unique
and extraordinary mechanism for the effective creation of new international law”.
27
At the same time, the Appellate Body has considerably reduced the harmonization pull of the SPS/TBT
compliance presumptions by finding that (i) national regulations must “conform to” (not simply be “based
on”) international standards to benefit from the presumption and (ii) deviation from an international
standard does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. See infra note 29. This led Joanne Scott to
say that “the AB has been notably diffident in according authority to such [international] standards,
conscious perhaps of the disputed legitimacy of the bodies responsible for them”, going as far as
concluding that the “authority [of international standards] within the WTO would seem, at present, to be
modest in the extreme” (Joanne Scott, International Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating Rules
(and Standards) in the EU and the WTO, 15 EJIL (2004) 307, at 310 and 330).
28
Joanne Scott, supra note 27, at 311-2 and .
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legally binding norm consented to by the disputing parties. In this sense, Scott’s
approach would trump the consent rule even beyond what is currently the case in
SPS/TBT and in respect of other, non-WTO treaties go far beyond my proposal, outlined
earlier, of applying non-WTO rules before a WTO panel as long as they are binding on
the disputing parties.
To close the discussion on SPS/TBT references to international standards, an important
question remains whether those standards operate only as a tool to loosen-up national
regulations that go beyond international standards (as in EC – Hormones or EC –
Sardines where EC regulations were found to be too strict) or whether those standards
could also be invoked to tighten national regulations against countries that fall below the
minimum of the international standard. Put differently, do the international standards
operate only as a common ceiling or maximum (beyond which countries will have to
offer specific justifications) or also as a floor or minimum under which WTO members
cannot go? If the international standards would also have the latter (floor) effect, the SPS
and TBT agreements would have a strong harmonizing pull. If not, the incentive to
harmonize is limited to the safe-haven offered by conforming to the standard.29
SPS Article 3.1 provides as follows
To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible,
Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international
standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise
provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3.
Now, if an international standard does exist, the only two alternatives to “basing”
measures on it (as required in SPS Art. 3.130) are

29

(i)

to more fully “conform to” the standard (in which case WTO consistency
is presumed under SPS Art. 3.2), or

(ii)

to introduce a measure “which results in a higher level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on”
the standard and to offer scientific justification for it.

Note, however, that deviating from the standard by means of a stricter national measure is not punished
in Appellate Body case law. In EC – Hormones, the Appellate Body reversed the panel on burden of proof
under SPS Article 3.3, finding that even when a member deviates from an international standard, it remains
for the complainant to proof that the measure is not scientifically justified (or at least to establish a
presumption or prima facie case to this effect). Intriguingly, the subsequent Panel on EC – Sardines
reverted to the panel approach in EC – Hormones (shifting the burden of proving TBT consistency to the
EC because it had deviated from the Codex standard) but was once again reversed by the Appellate Body
(finding that it remains for Peru, the complainant, to prove TBT violation even in cases of deviation from
an international standard).
30
The Appellate Body in EC – Hormones found, however, that compliance with SPS Article 3.1 does not
presume SPS conformity. All other SPS requirements remain to be checked even if a measure is “based
on” an international standard.
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In other words, no ground can be found in the SPS agreement to deviate from the SPS
Art. 3.1 obligation to base measures on international standards by means of a measure
that results in lower levels of sanitary or phytosanitary protection. Under this reading, the
SPS agreement (in particular Art. 3.1) could then, indeed, be used to force a WTO
member to ratchet-up its national measures to the minimum level of an international
standard. The odd result of this is that the WTO would then essentially grant a request to
restrict trade more (that is, ask the defendant to impose stricter SPS measures).31
The obligation in TBT Art. 2.4 to “use” relevant international standards “as a basis” for
national technical regulations can be deviated from under somewhat broader language,
namely in case the international standard would be “an ineffective or inappropriate means
for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of
fundamental climatic or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems”.32
Although this could possibly be read to grant a right to also go below the floor of the
international standard, TBT Art. 2.4 remains focused (much like SPS Art. 3.3) on
deviations that exceed the level of fulfillment achieved by the international standard. If
the latter is correct, then also the TBT agreement could be used to ratchet up (rather than
down) domestic technical standards. Given the broad scope of relevant international
standards under the TBT agreement, such reading could transform the WTO from an
organization worried about technical standards that are too strict, to one that forces
countries to comply with the minima set out in non-binding standards developed in other
fora, ranging from ISO to the Codex Commission, possibly including even MEAs and the
Kimberley Scheme on conflict diamonds (recall, in this respect, the problem of
conflicting international standards: if the WTO is to enforce a minimum ceiling, which
of two divergent standards should it then enforce?). This logical conclusion may well be
a strong argument to distinguish the permitted deviations under SPS (explicitly stated to
include only deviation by higher standards) from those under TBT (including both higher
and lower standards, as long as the international standard is proven to be “ineffective or
inappropriate”). If, in the alternative, the Appellate Body were to permit only deviations
by higher standard also under TBT, Joan Scott’s argument for the Appellate Body to
exercise closer scrutiny over the procedural qualities and legitimacy of international
standards would gain all the more force. In any event, the very definition of
“international standards” under TBT ought then be more carefully circumscribed than it
has been to date.

31

Note, indeed, that for the SPS agreement to apply in the first place, the defendant measure have some
form of measure that “directly or indirectly, affect international trade” (SPS Art. 1.1) and falls within one
of the definitions of an SPS measure (set out in Annex A.1).
32
Similar language is provided for domestic “standards” deviating from international standards pursuant to
TBT Annex 3.F (permitting deviation whenever the international standard “would be ineffective or
inappropriate, for instance, because of an insufficient level of protection or fundamental climatic or
geographical factors or fundamental technological problems”). In respect of conformity assessment
procedures, the exception is even broader, namely deviation is tolerated whenever the standard is
“inappropriate for the Members concerned” (TBT Art. 5.4).
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Legal Patterns that are not binding on the disputing parties, nor “international
standards” under SPS/TBT
This leaves us with non-traditional sources of global regulation that are not binding on
the disputing parties, nor incorporated in the SPS or TBT agreements. Is there any scope
for WTO panels to take account of such sources, notwithstanding the rule of stateconsent?
Quite surprisingly, whilst my proposal for panels to apply non-WTO rules that were
agreed on by the disputing parties has met fierce resistance33, the actual practice of the
Appellate Body has, in certain respects, gone even beyond what I propose.34 The
Appellate Body has, indeed, referred to other international treaties that were not even
agreed to by the disputing parties. In my view, those instances raise more questions of
legitimacy and state consent than my, less ambitious, proposal for panels to apply rules
that the parties have explicitly agreed to in the first place.
Two Appellate Body cases come to mind. Firstly, in US – Shrimp the Appellate Body
read the terms “exhaustible natural resources” in GATT Article XX
in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations.
It found expression of those concerns in a series of treaties that were not even binding on
the disputing parties (in particular, MEAs and UNCLOS not binding on the US).
Similarly, in EC – GSP the Appellate Body interpreted the terms “development, financial
[or] trade need” in the Enabling Clause with reference to
broad-based recognition of a particular need, set out in … multilateral instruments
adopted by international organizations.35
Once again, whether or not those non-WTO instruments were binding on the disputing
parties was not discussed. In that case, the instruments in question were “several
international conventions and resolutions that have recognized drug production and drug
trafficking as entailing particular problems for developing countries”.36 No question was
raised whether India, the complainant, was a party or bound to any or all of these
instruments.
How could those references to norms not binding on the disputing parties be justified? In
my view, it is possible to interpret Article 31.3(c) of the Vienna Convention sufficiently
33

See the forthcoming Proceedings of the 2004 ASIL Meeting in Washington D.C. (critique by Joel
Trachtman and Debra Steger).
34
For another surprising critique of sovereignty and the consent rule it entails (from one of the original
founders of the academic discipline of GATT/WTO law), see John Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A nEw
Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AJIL (2004) 782-802.
35
Appellate Body report on EC – GSP, para. 163.
36
Ibid., footnote 335.

Pauwelyn, Draft 5 Sept. 2004

- 17 -

broadly so as to call those norms “rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties“ (that is, part of the rules which WTO panels must refer to when
interpreting the WTO treaty pursuant to Art. 3.2 of the DSU).
Elsewhere37, I have expressed the view that it is not sufficient for an Article 31.3(c) rule
to be binding only on the disputing parties (“parties” in the Vienna Convention is defined
not as parties to a particular dispute but as the parties to the treaty38), nor is it, in my
view, necessary that the rule is legally binding on all WTO members, in the strict sense
that it confers rights or obligations on all WTO members (reference is made to rules
“applicable in the relations between the parties”, not rules “legally binding on all the
parties”).39 In my opinion, it suffices that the rule reflects the common intentions or
understanding of WTO members as a whole regarding the meaning of a particular WTO
term.
The process of treaty interpretation, at least the way I understand it, is a fairly limited
one. A word or string of words in a WTO provision – be it “exhaustible natural
resources” or “necessary” in GATT Article XX, or “development, financial and trade
need” in the Enabling Clause -- is not entirely clear and must be given meaning. In the
process of defining those specific terms, must a panel limit itself to outside material that
is legally binding on all WTO members? I do not think so. Rather, it suffices that those
outside sources reflect a definition or provide a meaning that is commonly understood by
all WTO members. After all, interpreting a WTO term with reference to other sources is
not adding legally binding rights or obligations to the WTO term, but a rather technical,
linguistic exercise of defining the very meaning of the WTO term. Indeed, the very first
outside source that panels and the Appellate Body consistently refer to is surely one that
is not legally binding on all WTO members, namely: the Oxford English Dictionary
where traditionally “ordinary meaning” is found. Equally so, in my view, the
distinguishing factor for rules under Article 31.3(c) ought not be that they are legally
binding on all WTO members, but rather that they reflect a common understanding
between WTO members.
37

JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003), 253272.
38
Vienna Convention Article 2(1)(g).
39
In contrast, Article 31.2(a) refers to “any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty (emphasis added).” In this Article, the word “all”,
qualifies the phrase “between the parties”. This suggests that the absence of the word “all” to qualify the
phrase “between the parties” in Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c) means that not all the parties to the
WTO need to be parties to the rule of international law. Similarly, Article 31.3(b) refers to “any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation”. The commentary to Article 31.3(b) states as follows:
The text provisionally adopted in 1964 spoke of a practice which ‘establishes the understanding of
all the parties’. By omitting the word ‘all’ the Commission did not intend to change the rule. It
considered that the phrase ‘the understanding of the parties’ necessarily means ‘the parties as a
whole’. It omitted the word ‘all’ merely to avoid any possible misconception that every party
must individually have engaged in the practice where it suffices that it should have accepted the
practice” (Rauschning, Dietrich, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Travaux
Préparatoires (1978), 254).
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Crucially, such reading of Article 31.3(c) could then include
(i)

rules that are not necessarily binding on all WTO members, as well as

(ii)

rules or broader legal patterns developed by non-state actors

for as long as they can be said to represent a common understanding of a particular term
as between the WTO membership as a whole (and this irrespective of the time of
enactment of those other rules, be it before or after the conclusion of the WTO treaty in
199440).
A similar result could be reached, following the same line of argument, under
Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention calling for an interpretation of WTO terms “in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms”.
At the same time, this approach (be it under Art. 31.3(c) or Art. 31.1) begs the question of
how to decide when and whether a particular norm or legal pattern reflects the common
understanding of all WTO members and/or offers a good faith meaning in line with
ordinary meaning (and whether this is a task that can be safely put in the hands of the
judiciary41). The least that the Appellate Body could, however, do is to give some
explanation as to why the instruments it referred to in US – Shrimp and EC – GSP meet
its threshold of relevance.
Finally, non-traditional sources of global regulation could also play a role as factual
references or benchmarks (much like comparative analysis of domestic laws in other
WTO members) for panels to decide, for example, whether a country acted in a nondiscriminatory manner (as the Appellate Body did in US – Shrimp 21.5, referring to the
Inter-American Convention on turtle protection), whether a stated concern can be seen as
“legitimate” or a measure or standard can be termed as “necessary” or “appropriate”. For
legal patterns to play such factual role there is no need that they are binding on the
disputing parties nor that they necessarily reflect the common understanding of WTO
members as a whole or even be state-created norms (NGO or MNC codes of good
conduct could also be referred to). Still, while panels may (and actually must) refer to
interpretative tools under the Vienna Convention at their own initiative, panels can, in
principle, only refer to other rules as facts when the disputing parties themselves have
invoked such facts. Moreover, the weight of rules relied on by panels as legally binding
norms or interpretative references will generally be higher and of a more decisive nature
than rules simple referred to as facts.

40

This evolutionary approach to treaty interpretation was explicitly confirmed by the Appellate Body in US
– Shrimp. Note, in addition, that the Oxford English Dictionary referred to by the Appellate Body is
always the most recent version, not the one prevalent in 1994.
41
Note, in this respect, Joanne Scott’s statement that “[a] commitment to textual fidelity will not buy
interpretative peace of mind” (supra note 27, 311).
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Conclusion

The risk of trade obligations being over-inclusive -- because WTO panels cannot
sufficiently defer to non-traditional patters of global regulation -- seems limited. With
some creativity, several avenues can be detected for WTO panels to give effect to nonWTO norms, both those that are binding on the disputing parties and those that are not,
both hard law and softer law or “standards”, both inter-state norms and norms developed
by, or with the input from, non-state actors.
Yet, these multiple forms of reference to outside sources imply different degrees of
deference. Whilst under Vienna Convention rules on treaty interpretation non-traditional
sources not binding on the parties can be of linguistic/sociological value (that is, shed
light on how a given society gives meaning to a specific term), their role as factual
references is limited to the process of how to apply pre-defined WTO law to the facts of a
specific case. In contrast, when WTO panels apply other treaties that are binding on the
disputing parties in defense of a claim of WTO violation, such other treaties have
independent legal/normative value, transcending mere linguistic or factual relevance, and
may eventually (depending on the relevant conflict rule) trump or overrule explicit
provisions in the WTO treaty.
It is crucial to keep in mind these different shades of relevance. They make it possible
for WTO panels to engage in a delicate balancing act between, on the one hand, taking
cognizance of non-traditional sources – and thereby mitigate the risk of “confined” or
“within-the-box” adjudication limited to the confines of hard WTO law – and, on the
other, to respect the rule that no state can be legally held by a norm without its consent.42
The crucial issue, when accepting such roles for non-traditional sources, remains,
however, their legitimacy both in the sense of how and by whom these new sources were
created (raising questions of due process, procedural openness, etc.) and what they imply
in terms of substance (raising questions of impartiality, scientific justification, technical
accuracy, etc.). As pointed out earlier, these questions of procedural and substantive
legitimacy are particularly acute for international standards broadly referred to in the
TBT agreement. This brings us to the final section of this paper (Section III.2). It
examines how new patterns of global regulation can be controlled and disciplined, in
particular, whether they may, in and of themselves, become trade restrictions that need
corrective action at the WTO (or national) level.

2.

Are WTO trade obligations under-inclusive?

The previous section (Section III.1) tried to demonstrate that even under the current
regime, and using traditional international law tools, the WTO is capable to take account
of non-traditional sources of global regulation in the settlement of trade disputes. If the
42

In contrast, for example, to Joanne Scott’s suggestions (supra note 27) where, to her own admission, her
proposals conflict with the rule of state consent.
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proposals set out earlier are followed, the WTO could thereby significantly mitigate the
risk of over-inclusion of trade obligations.
As pointed out in the introduction, however, new sources of global regulation also pose a
risk of under-inclusion of trade obligations: non-traditional sources, and the non-state
actors that make or enforce them, may constitute unjustifiable trade barriers that escape
the state-focused reach of the WTO and traditional international law more generally.
Does the WTO, thereby, risk ‘missing the boat’ by tolerating norms and conduct (such as
codes of good practice, NGO boycotts or semi-private standards) that may restrict trade
as much as, or even more than, traditional tariffs or state imposed quantitative
restrictions?
This concern of under-inclusion is a real one. Although new patterns of global social
regulation (ranging from NGO codes of conduct, to the UN Norms on the Responsibility
of Transnational Corporations) are mostly well intended, there is a real and present
danger that they restrict trade in a manner disproportionate to the extent that they achieve
social objectives.43 This trade distorting effect is particularly felt in developing countries
which may have a harder time complying with social standards (especially if they are set
from a rich world perspective) and may find it particularly costly to keep track of, and
adjust to, conflicting and diverging sets of standards developed by a wide range of intergovernmental organizations, countries, MNCs and NGOs.44
Moreover, how to ensure that standards enacted by non-state actors are legitimate, based
on good science, information or technology and/or represent the democratically
supported wishes and concerns of consumers and the broader population? As much as
governments are pushed toward protectionism by special interest groups with high
political clout (explaining why we need a WTO in the first place), NGOs and MNCs may
equally be driven by protectionist purposes: NGOs can be pressured by domestic
workers adamant to keep out imports and foreign competition45; MNCs, in turn, may be
focused on outpacing their foreign competitors by setting standards that only they can
meet (or claim to meet) without much cost.

43

For a blistering critique of Corporate Social Responsibility, arguing that corporations should stick to their
profit making objective and that it remains for governments to intervene in the market place for noneconomic, social ends, see DAVID HENDERSON, THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN THE MODERN
WORLD, PROGRESS, PRESSURE AND PROSPECTS FOR THE MARKET ECONOMY (The Institute
of Economic Affairs, 2004).
44
The World Bank, for example, imposes different standards for public as opposed to private lending.
Public lending is governed by the World Bank’s own so-called ‘safeguard policies’ on environmental
assessments, pollution abatement, indigenous people etc., there where private lending is governed by the
rules of a separate arm of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC). See Andrew Balls,
World Bank ‘weakening’ social safeguards, Financial Times, 3 September, 2004.
45
For an interesting example, see the recent efforts by China’s trade union authority (the All China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), classified in China as a “social group” rather than a government
organization) ensuring that foreign companies established in China, in particular Wal-Mart, comply with
the right for workers to establish unions (James Kynge, Chinese body to probe companies’ failure to
establish trade unions, Financial Times, 1 September 2004).
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Obvious improvements would be to seek the input from all countries and stakeholders
when developing standards, adjusting certain standards to the needs of developing
countries and reducing the discrepancies between standards emanating from different
sources. Government involvement there where standards are really needed, as well as
appropriate market responses and corrections that guide the content and implementation
of codes of good practice (such as consumer feed-back and spending patterns in response
to bogus standards or false statements by companies or NGOs regarding compliance with
standards), can offer other ways of legitimization.
Yet, if the WTO is so adamant about striking down wasteful and unjustified trade
distortions enacted by governments, why ought it tolerate with such equanimity similar
trade distortions enacted or brought about by non-state actors? Given that traditional
government-enacted tariffs and quotas have, in most sectors, been reduced to
commercially insignificant levels, are those non-state sources of protectionism not
destined to equal or even surpass the importance of governmental protectionism?
This is not the place to discuss whether the WTO ought to include competition or antitrust policies, tackling distortions created by price-fixing or other agreements between
private operators. For present purposes, the question is rather whether and how global
social regulations themselves ought to be controlled, legitimized or checked to avoid that
they translate into new forms of protectionism and thereby decrease, rather than increase,
global welfare.
I first address potential controls at the international/WTO level and thereafter address
some recent developments on the domestic legal scene, particularly in the United States.
a.

Control at the international/WTO level

Unlike the relative openness of the WTO, and traditional international law more
generally, to non-traditional sources in the settlement of trade disputes between states, the
current legal system is virtually closed to complaints against non-state conduct. WTO
obligations, in particular, only relate to government conduct (including limited
obligations on states to tackle certain anti-competitive private behavior).
Two notable (though limited) exceptions must be pointed out. Both subject entities that
are not strictly speaking governmental to WTO discipline on the ground that these
entities have been granted special privileges by the government. In essence, they are
anti-circumvention provisions to avoid that WTO members circumvent their obligations
by exercising prohibited conduct through private bodies.
Firstly, Article XVII of GATT bans certain types of discriminatory conduct of State
enterprises and enterprise that were granted exclusive or special privileges by the state.46
Other provisions on so-called state-trading enterprises can be found, inter alia, in GATT
Article II:4, the ad Note to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII as well as in Article VI
46

See the recent Appellate Body Report on Canada – Measures Relating to the Exports of Wheat and
Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R, circulated 30 August 2004.
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of GATT. The conduct of MNCs and NGOs at issue here would hardly qualify under
those provisions, for lack of a sufficient nexus with the government. Yet, the problem
raised by this new type of potentially trade distorting conduct reminds one of the
rationale behind these, in 1947 negotiated, GATT provisions, namely: avoid that nonstate entities engage in essentially the same conduct that the GATT prohibits when
engaged in by states.
Secondly, the TBT agreement imposes disciplines on mandatory “technical regulations”
and voluntary “standards” enacted by non-governmental bodies (TBT Articles 3, 4 and
8). However, as noted earlier, such non-governmental bodies are strictly defined in TBT
Annex 1.8 as
a “[b]ody other than a central government body or a local government body,
including a non-governmental body which has legal power to enforce a technical
regulation.
NGOs which have not been conferred such power by the state are not subject to the TBT
agreement. Even NGOs which only have the power to enforce voluntary “standards” -not “technical regulations” which are defined under TBT as mandatory -- would not seem
to fall under the TBT agreement. This would seem to exclude, for example, Social
Accountability International (SAI) which was granted the legal power to monitor
compliance with criteria in the Belgian social label on the ground that the social label is
only voluntary, not mandatory. Note, however, that the Belgian government itself
remains subject to the TBT agreement for enactment of the social label, even if this label
is purely voluntary. The label merely qualifies as a “standard”, not a “technical
regulation”.47
Another exception in the WTO treaty subjecting conduct that is not strictly speaking
governmental to WTO discipline is its obligations on state trading enterprises
47

This seems to be a fact disregarded by Belgium itself. See the website of the Belgian social label at
http://mineco.fgov.be/redir_new.asp?loc=/protection_consumer/social_label/home_nl.htm
where
the
question is raised whether the social label is consistent with WTO rules. The response given is as follows
(translated from Dutch):
No! This would only be the case if the law were to impose a social label on companies or in case
it were to prohibit the sale in Belgium of products without a label. This is not the case:
everything happens on a completely voluntary basis.
Obviously, anyone familiar with the TBT Agreement knows that even voluntary labels must comply with
the Code of Good Practice (TBT Annex 3) and that voluntary labels may have a trade restrictive effect and
hence fall also under GATT Article III. Although I think that the Belgian law could eventually be justified
under the TBT Agreement (as a “necessary obstacle to international trade” in line with Annex 3.E), it is
more doubtful whether it would pass the GATT test (GATT Art. XX does not explicitly list labor
concerns). Even if such GATT violation were found, however, TBT prevails over GATT (General
Interpretative Note to Annex 1A). In any event, rather than rejecting the application of WTO rules in the
first place, regulating countries ought to engage in a discussion of why their initiatives meet specific WTO
disciplines (see the TBT Committee meetings held in Geneva, G/TBT/M/23 and 24, where very strong
criticism was raised, especially by developing countries, against the Belgian law).

Pauwelyn, Draft 5 Sept. 2004

- 23 -

In essence, it is only international criminal law that makes international legal obligations
directly enforceable against non-state actors, in particular, individuals. Corporations
have also been subjected to international law.48 However, with the possible exception of
the (yet to be adopted) UN Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations
(where provision is made for direct UN monitoring of corporations, instead of states),
these obligations are imposed only indirectly on corporations, that is, it is first for states
to sign or agree to the convention or code of practice and then for the state to translate the
convention or code into domestic law. In this sense, at the international level, the
obligation rests on states, not on corporations.
Crucially, so far not a single inter-governmental instrument disciplines the conduct of
NGOs. Notwithstanding the increased influence and power on the global scene of NGOs
such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, Greenpeace or the Sierra Club, NGOs are not
subject to any global regulation other than their own internal rules.
For corporations (and, even more so, NGOs) to be held directly by international law at
the international level a true paradigm shift would be needed (recall, however, that MNCs
do have rights under investor-state mechanisms such as NAFTA). In this context, the
crucial question is whether there is a need -- and if so when precisely it arises -- to
leapfrog the level of the state. In other words, when (if at all) should international law
impose obligations directly on MNCs instead of getting a commitment from states that
they will ensure corporate compliance under domestic law? Although jumping the level
of the state may make corporations more directly accountable, it also does away with the
main source of legitimization of international law, namely state consent and control.
The latter, gate-keeping and interest-aggregation role of states seems to be one of the core
lessons learnt under NAFTA Chapter 11 where investors have invoked and enforced
direct rights against states that were far removed from what NAFTA negotiators had in
mind when drafting Chapter 11.49 One view is to regard the direct investor rights granted
to MNCs under investment treaties as of a temporary nature only. Indeed, one of the
main reasons why investor-protection rights were included in treaties was a general
mistrust of the domestic legal systems in developing countries (in NAFTA: Mexico)
which, it was feared, could not be counted on to protect the rights of foreign investors in
an unbiased way. Once these domestic failures are cured though (and, for example, the
host state has a credible and impartial commercial code and court system of its own), the
argument could be made that investment treaties should revert to the traditional state-tostate mode and MNCs themselves should focus once again on domestic law where, for
example, US and Canadian companies can exercise their rights before Mexican courts
and if they feel mistreated ought to convince their government to lodge a case against
Mexico.

48

For a discussion, see Harold Koh, Separating Myth from Reality about Corporate Responsibility
Litigation, 7 JIEL (2004) 263.
49
NAFTA members went as far as issuing an authoritative interpretation of crucial Chapter 11 provisions
to limit their scope.
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Domestic control

Besides international regulation of non-state actors, non-state actors can and are,
obviously, controlled also under domestic law, be it commercial or anti-trust law for
MNCs or general torts and contract law for MNCs and NGOs. As pointed out earlier,
international regulation ought in principle only be necessary in case domestic regulation
cannot achieve the objective, for example, when the global reach and activities of nonstate actors can no longer be controlled by mere domestic law and international
coordination is needed (or, in the case of trade and investment law, when domestic law
cannot be ‘trusted’ for subject to protectionist pressures and governments must tie their
hands to the mast of the WTO to avoid ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ policies).
As was the case for international regulation, domestic control over NGOs remains,
however, extremely limited. An important question for the future will be whether the
activities of NGOs must be subjected to scrutiny and control (other than that by their own
members, contributors and consumer at large in the market place) and, if so, to what
extent and by what means.
In respect of domestic control, in particular over MNCs, two recent US cases are
instructive: Nike v. Kasky and Sosa v. Alavarez-Machain. I deal with them in turn.
Nike v. Kasky (fair competition versus freedom of speech)
An interesting development in respect of domestic control over corporate social
responsibility is the 2003 Nike v. Kasky case in the US.50 This case tests the limits of
domestic unfair competition and consumer protection laws as a means to control
corporate social responsibility, in particular, to check whether MNCs are, indeed,
complying with codes of good conduct or international norms when they claim to do so
(with inaccurate statements MNCs could distort competition by falsely claiming to be
good corporate citizens and attract consumers to the detriment of competitors who may
be spending millions to comply with good practice).
The dispute pitted global sportswear giant Nike against a San Francisco anti-sweatshop
activist Marc Kasky. Besieged with a series of allegations that it was mistreating and
underpaying workers at foreign facilities, Nike responded by sending out press releases
and letters as well as commissioning a report (by a former US Ambassador to the UN) on
labor conditions in Nike production facilities. The report “commented favorably on
working conditions in the factories and found no evidence of widespread abuse or
mistreatment of workers”. In response, Kasky sued Nike for unfair and deceptive
practices under California’s Unfair Competition and False Advertising Law claiming that
to maintain and/or increase sales Nike made a number of “false statements and/or
material omissions of fact” concerning the working conditions under which Nike
products are manufactured. As permitted under California law, Kasky brought the suit
50

See 539 U.S. Supreme Court (2003) No. 02-575.
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“on behalf of the General Public of the State of California” without demonstrating any
harm or damages regarding himself as an individual.
The trial court, as confirmed by the California Court of Appeal, dismissed the case
holding that Nike’s statements “form[ed] part of a public dialogue on a matter of public
concern within the core area of expression protected by the First Amendment”. On
appeal, however, the California Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings, finding that
[b]ecause the messages in question were directed by a commercial speaker to a
commercial audience, and because they made representations of fact about the
speaker’s own business operations for the purpose of promoting sales of its
products … [the] messages are commercial speech.
The case was subsequently dealt with before the US Supreme Court but the writ of
certiori was ultimately dismissed as improvidently granted on procedural and
jurisdictional grounds without entering into the substance of this intriguing conflict
between, on the one hand, fair competition and advertising and, on the other, freedom of
(corporate) speech. In sum, under US law (First Amendment), commercial speech is less
protected than non-commercial (political) speech. If Nike’s statements were found to be
commercial speech, the case would have tipped in favor of Kasky; if the statements were
seen as political speech, however, it would have tipped in favor of Nike. Eventually, the
case was settled out of court with Nike paying Kasky $1.5 million, a sum that Kasky
donated to the Fair Labor Association, a Washington-based NGO that monitors corporate
labor practices abroad.
Whilst MNC social practices (or at least statements about them) may thus be held against
domestic fair competition and advertising laws (although a general reluctance to do so
can be detected in the US judiciary other than California’s Supreme Court), the question
remains, however, how the accuracy of NGO statements and reports criticizing
corporations can, in their turn, be controlled. Although NGOs are not as such selling
goods as economic competitors (and would thus seem to escape competition laws) NGO
statements about certain goods or companies may influence consumers even more than
corporate statements (possibly leading to a consumer boycott of specific MNCs). MNCs
will, indeed, often be inclined to settle any NGO complaint as soon as possible, even if
unjustified, only to avoid the bad publicity.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (international law under the Alien Torts Claim Act)
A hybrid form of control over the social conduct of MNCs is to enforce international
legal obligations directly on non-state actors before domestic courts. This is most
famously done in the US under the Alien Torts Claim Act where US federal courts
enforce certain international norms against individuals and companies (and possibly also
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NGOs). On June 29, 2004, the US Supreme Court issued its very first opinion on this
more than 200 years old statute in the Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain case.51
Sosa had, at the demand of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), abducted
Alvarez-Machain in Mexico to stand trial in the US for a DEA agent’s torture and murder
(both Sosa and Alvarez are Mexican). After his acquittal, Alvarez sued Sosa for violating
the law of nations under the Alien Tort statute (ATS), a 1789 law giving district courts
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
The District Court accepted the claim and awarded Alvarez damages. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. However, the US Supreme Court reversed it. It
found that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action”.
According to the Supreme Court, the only claims or causes of action that can be brought
under the ATS are those originally intended in 1789, namely “offenses against
ambassadors, violation of safe conduct, and piracy”. As to post-1789 types of claims, the
Supreme Court held that “there are good reasons for a restrained conception of the
discretion a federal court should exercise in considering such a new cause of action”.
The Supreme Court decided, more particularly, that
federal courts should not recognize claims under federal common law for
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations than the 18th-century paradigms familiar when [the ATS]
was enacted.
This proved fatal for Alvarez’s claim under the ATS which had invoked the “prohibition
of arbitrary arrest”. The Court implied, however, that the ATS does offer a cause of
action for more established international law norms such as the prohibition of torture and
slave trade (for torture there is also the more explicit Torture Victim Protection Act, 28
U.S.C. para. 1350a).

IV.

CONCLUSION

The risk that the WTO ‘misses the boat’ of non-traditional patterns of global regulation is
real. Softer forms of regulation and norms or standards created by, and for, non-state
actors (in particular NGOs, MNCs and semi-private standardizing bodies) have gained
importance, particularly so in the social field. (Section II). The WTO, in contrast,
operates under a hard law, state-focused paradigm that only controls the conduct of
governments.
At the same time, traditional international law does offer avenues to take account of these
non-traditional sources of global regulation both those that are binding on the disputing
parties and those that are not, both hard law and softer law or standards, both inter-state
51
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norms and norms developed by, or with the input from, non-state actors. Such
incorporation techniques range from a broader definition of the applicable law before
WTO panels and explicit references to international standards in the SPS and TBT
agreements, to novel approaches to treaty interpretation and construing non-traditional
sources as factual evidence. If and when carefully construed these avenues – albeit with
different shades of relevance and in a way that raises new questions of legitimacy -- can
mitigate the risk of over-inclusion of trade obligations. (Section III).
In contrast, traditional international law at present offers very limited possibilities to
discipline or control the conduct of non-state actors when exercising their new normcreating and enforcing functions. These functions may distort trade as much as
government conduct, yet generally fall outside the scope of WTO discipline. This entails
a risk of under-inclusion of trade obligations. The fallback of control by domestic law is
equally fragile, as illustrated by recent US cases that show a reluctance to subject MNC
statements or conduct in the social field to the disciplines of unfair competition laws or
the Alien Torts claims act. (Section IV).

